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1. Introduction 
In this short note, we will examine some recent developments in the government budget position in 
Singapore, against the backdrop of sharp fluctuations in domestic activity, following the increased 
volatility in the key IT markets as well as in final demand in the United States. Our objective is to shed 
some light on the operation of automatic stabilisers in Singapore, particularly in the revenue 
components as well as on computations of the fiscal impulse measure, which gives an indication of the 
discretionary budgetary responses adopted by the government during the downturn of 2001. 
2.  The automatic stabilisers in operating revenue 
The recovery of operating revenue in 2000 reflected the cyclical upturn, when the economy grew 
strongly. Government receipts vary to some extent with the business cycle, growing during booms and 
shrinking in recessions. For Singapore, this automatic stabiliser effect largely operates through taxes, 
particularly income taxes, which help moderate the fall in income when private economic activity 
declines and restrain the increase in income when activity rises. 
The effect of the automatic stabiliser was observed in both the recent economic downturn during the 
Asian crisis and the mid-1980s recession in Singapore, when operating revenue initially declined and 
picked up subsequently as the economy recovered. Graph 1 shows the cycles of operating revenue 
for both periods: fiscal years 1984-87 (solid line) and 1996-99 (dashed line) relative to the troughs 
reached in each period. During the mid-1980s economic downturn, operating revenue collection 
declined for two years before picking up in FY 1987. In contrast, revenue contracted only in FY 1998 
during the recent slowdown. At the same time, the rate of contraction in the 1980s was much faster 
than that in the 1990s, reflecting the relatively more severe recession in the earlier period when 
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 However, the rebound in operating revenue in the 1980s was also quicker. These trends in operating 
revenue would have been influenced by three factors, for which they should be adjusted before any 
inferences on the automatic stabilisers can be made. First, in both the mid-1980s and the recent Asian 
crisis, discretionary policy measures were implemented to help support the economy during the 
downturn. The impact of these measures was quantified based on estimates in budget speeches and 
off-budget announcements (Box A), and adjusted for in operating revenue (Box B). Second, there 
appears to have been a faster response in operating revenue to activity in the 1990s. In contrast, GDP 
turned around in FY 1986, but operating revenue did not pick up until FY 1987. Lastly, the impact of 
the differing pace of GDP contraction and resurgence in the two periods was adjusted for by scaling 
the revenue receipts by nominal GDP. 
 
Box A 
Impact of discretionary fiscal policy on operating revenue 
We quantified the discretionary policy changes affecting operating revenue from the annual budgets of 
FY 1985-86 and FY 1998-99 as well as from the off-budget announcements. The revenue loss was then added 
to the actual operating revenue data.  
Estimated revenue loss per annum 
(SGD millions) 
 Policy  changes   
FY 1985 budget  Suspension of payroll and telecom tax 
Reduction in entertainment duty 
–176 
–26 
Off-budget 26 July 1985  30% property tax rebate effective 1 July 1985, for 1½ years  –260 
Off-budget 31 August 1985  Reduction in ad valorem duty on petrol from 60% to 50%  –122 
Off-budget 24 October 1985  Suspension of 10% tax on PUB gas and electricity charges  –92 
FY 1986 budget  50% property tax rebate for the year 
25% rebate on personal income tax for FY 1986 
–440 
–250 
FY 1998 budget  5% tax rebate on personal income tax for FY 1998 
15% property tax rebate 
Property tax exemption for land under development 
Abolition of stamp duty on all instruments, except those 






Off-budget June 1998  Additional 40% property tax rebate 
Suspension of car park surcharge 
Deferment of stamp duty by buyers of uncompleted property 





Off-budget November 1998  10% corporate tax rebate in FY 1999 
Extension of property tax rebate till June 2000 
Extension of the suspension of stamp duty on contract notes 
till June 2000 
Reduction in foreign worker levy 
Reduction in custom duty on cars 
Extension of road tax rebate for a second year 
Reduction in petrol excise duty 
Removal of speed diesel excise duty 













FY 1999 budget  10% tax rebate on personal income tax in FY 1999  –275 
November 1999 
announcement 
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 Box B 
The resulting series gives the operating revenue excluding the effects from discretionary policies. For example, 
in FY 1985, our calculation indicates that the net impact of discretionary policy changes was SGD 0.5 billion. 
Hence, the adjusted revenue would come in at SGD 9.0 billion, compared to the actual collection of 
SGD 8.5 billion. 





(SGD m)  % change 
Revenue loss from 
policy changes 
(SGD m)  Levels 
(SGD m)  % change 
1983 9,321  na  0  9,321  na 
1984 9,682  3.9  0  9,682  3.9 
1985 8,461  –12.6  –522  8,983  –7.2 
1986 7,083  –16.3  –830  7,913  –11.9 
1987 8,006  13.0  –746  8,752  10.6 
1996 27,053  9.8  0  27,053  9.8 
1997 28,480  5.3  0  28,480  5.3 
1998 26,111  –8.3  –1,061 27,172  –4.6 






Graph 2 incorporates all three adjustments. The contraction and subsequent recovery in the ratio of 
operating revenue to GDP was faster in the 1980s than in the most recent downturn, suggesting that 
the magnitude of automatic stabilisers in the government’s tax system may have declined over the 
years. 
Graph 2 
Ratio of adjusted operating revenue to GDP 
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Two main factors determine the effectiveness of the automatic stabilisers - the elasticity of revenue 
items with respect to GDP and the effective tax rate.
2 The automatic stabiliser effect is generally 
stronger the higher the effective tax rate. Similarly, the effectiveness of a tax system in cushioning 
                                                       
2  A measure of the automatic stabiliser is the change in tax revenue per unit of change in income, dT/dY. Elasticity is the ratio 
of the percentage change in tax revenues per unit of change in income, (dT/dY)(Y/T). 
 Therefore dT/dY = (dT/dY)(Y/T) * (T/Y) or measure of automatic stabiliser = elasticity * effective tax rate. 
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 changes in income is greater the higher its elasticity with respect to its base. The Monetary Authority 
of Singapore’s econometric estimates show that the elasticities of revenue have in fact declined 
compared with estimates obtained from an earlier study done in 1995 (see Table 1). The decline 
captures the impact from the increasing reliance on broad-based indirect taxes like GST, which 
generally have lower elasticities. 
 
Table 1 
Tax and non-tax elasticities
3 
Singapore Total  tax  Direct  Indirect  Non-tax
1 
1995 na 3.35  2.40  2.00 
2000 2.03 2.14 1.87 0.95 
1  This refers to non-tax operating revenue. 
 
With the introduction of GST in 1994 and the gradual reduction in income taxes, the proportion of 
indirect taxes increased to 34% of total operating revenue in the late 1990s from 27% in early to 
mid-1980s. While the shorter lags involved in GST collections also work to enhance the stabilising 
effect of the tax system, on balance it appears that the introduction of the broad-based tax has 
reduced the cyclical response of government tax revenue. In general, GST has smaller stabiliser 
effects, as fluctuations in consumption spending are usually not as pronounced as those of income 
cycles.
4 
Over the years, there has also been a gradual reduction in the effective tax rate. The effective 
personal income tax rate fell from 10% in the 1980s to 9.5% in the 1990s.
5 In addition, the progressive 
structure (and therefore stabiliser effects) of the personal income tax system has been weakened 
slightly with the reduction of the number of income brackets from 13 in 1984 to 10 in 1997. At the 
same time, the potential stabiliser effects of corporate income tax have been diluted over the years 
with the reduction in the statutory rate from 38.25% in 1984-85 to 26% in 1998-99. 
                                                       
3  
Tax elasticities in selected EU countries 
(1999) 
  Corporate tax  Individual tax  Indirect tax 
France  1.50 0.90 1.00 
Germany  2.50 0.90 1.00 
United  Kingdom  6.50 1.00 1.40 
Source: OECD and IMF staff estimates. 
 
4  The standard deviation of the growth rates of real private consumption was 4.2 over the period 1981-2000 compared to 9.8 
for the MAS macro model’s estimate of real disposable income. In addition, it is useful to note that automatic stabiliser 
effects are greater for income taxes, which are progressive, ie the ratio of tax to income rises when moving up the income 
scale. Receipts from a consumption tax, on the other hand, tend to respond in proportion to changes in income. 
5  The effective tax rates are calculated based on net tax payable and total chargeable income. Estimates of the effective tax 
rate for personal income from the MAS Monetary Model of Singapore, based on calculations of private disposable income, 
also showed a decrease between the mid-1980s and 1997-99 of about 2 percentage points. 
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 3.  The fiscal impulse measure 
As it is the changes in the size of the fiscal surplus, and not the absolute level per se, that determines 
the shift in the government’s fiscal stance, a smaller fiscal surplus would imply that fiscal policy has 
become more expansionary compared with the previous year. However, merely observing the change 
in fiscal balance may be misleading because it is not clear whether shifts in the position are the cause 
or the result of changes in economic activity. A summary measure is required that captures the 
change in the fiscal balance resulting from both discretionary government expenditure and tax policies 
as well as the impact of automatic stabilisers in the budget that respond to economic acitvity. 
One method of assessing the stance and thrust of fiscal policy is to measure the total impulse or initial 
stimulus to aggregate demand arising from the fiscal policy during a given period. A positive (negative) 
measure of fiscal impulse (MFI) will imply a more expansionary (contractionary) fiscal stance 
compared to the previous year. The changes in the MFI will capture the changes in both discretionary 
decisions on expenditure and revenue policies as well as the estimated effects of the automatic 
stabilisers. 
We make use of the IMF methodology described in Heller et al (1986) to calculate the MFI as follows: 
MFI = –∆ B – g0∆ Y
p + t0∆ Y 
where:  MFI  =  Absolute measure of the fiscal impulse 
  T =  Government  revenues 
  G =  Government  expenditures 
  ∆ B  =  The actual budget balance (first difference) (B = T – G) 
  g0 =  G0/Y0, base year expenditure ratio 
  t0 =  T0/Y0, base year revenue ratio 
  ∆ Y
p  = Potential  output
6 in nominal prices (first difference) 
  ∆ Y  =  Actual output in nominal prices (first difference) 
  and the subscript “0” refers to base year values of any variables. 
There are two important conceptual issues involved in the construction of the MFI. First, a number of 
industrialised countries select for the base year (t=0) for the MFI a year when the economy is 
assessed to be at its potential level of activity. Quite apart from the practical difficulties of choosing the 
base year using this method, it also means that the assessment of the change in fiscal stance in any 
one year could be distorted by the various changes in the tax policies, especially when the time period 
t0 becomes increasingly distant.
7 For the purposes of this study therefore, we have used the 
increasingly popular variant of adopting a “rolling” base year whereby the figures at time t are 
sequentially taken as base year figures for the MFI at time t+1. 
Second, we derive the cyclically neutral budget under the assumption of unitary elasticities of 
expenditure and revenue with respect to the potential and actual output, respectively. Defining the 
cyclically adjusted budget in this way allocates the contribution of automatic stabilisers to the MFI. We 
can think of an actual deficit in excess of the cyclically neutral deficit as expansionary, relative to the 
base year fiscal stance, and the MFI is positive. This MFI attempts to remove transitory changes (in a 
cyclical sense) in the actual budget balance. Hence a positive MFI will imply a more expansionary 
fiscal stance compared to the previous year. 
In addition, there are definitional issues to resolve before the MFI can be constructed. In line with the 
usual fiscal analysis, we define government revenue as government operating revenue and 
government expenditure as government operating and development expenditure. The government 
paid SGD 1.5 billion and SGD 1.9 billion in 1997 and 1999 respectively, to the telecommunications 
company for their loss of monopoly. In addition, a payment of some SGD 1.3 billion was made in 1997 
                                                       
6  Estimates of potential output are derived from the Monetary Model of Singapore. 
7  Singapore’s tax structure has shifted progressively towards a greater reliance on indirect sources of tax revenue. 
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 to compensate statutory boards for land returned to the government. Given that these payments were 
neither government consumption nor investment per se, they were removed to avoid distortions in our 
analysis. 
Separately, as there were some changes in the budget presentation starting from the 2001 fiscal year, 
some adjustments were made to construct a consistent series for our analysis. Net investment income 
was subtracted from the budgeted figures and the cost of land reclamation was added to development 
expenditure. While net investment income should not have any impact on the economy, it can also be 
argued that land reclamation projects do have some economic influence, representing an increase in 
productive capacity. We also had to re-estimate operating revenue, operating expenditure and 
development expenditure for calendar year 2002, since the budget numbers are stated for the fiscal 
year while our analysis is based on the calendar year. 
Our analysis shows that MFI has been positive since 2001, implying that the fiscal stance has been 
more expansionary than the year before. This reflects the more accommodating stance adopted by the 
government in view of the sharp economic slowdown. The Singapore economy contracted by 2.4% in 
2001, before staging a modest recovery of 2.2% the following year. 
Similarly, our estimated MFI for 2002 is relatively strong, at 3.7% of GDP, which in turn implies that 
fiscal policy has been more expansionary than in 2001. Of this, more than half can be attributed to the 
measures introduced through the off-budget packages in 2001 (see Graph 3). This largely reflects the 
acceleration of major infrastructure projects as well as the impact of the tax and fee rebates 
announced in 2001. 
Graph 3 
Fiscal impulse measure 
 






















It should be remembered that the MFI is designed to determine the direction of the change in 
budgetary stance, rather than to assess its effect on the economy. For a clearer picture of the impact 
of fiscal policy on the economy, it is necessary to complement the above analysis with a study of the 
fiscal multiplier effect using a macroeconomic model. 
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